A prevailing assumption in Western policy circles holds that African governments are passive recipients of Chinese digital infrastructure and, by extension, Chinese models of internet governance. A new analysis published in The Diplomat pushes back on that framing, arguing that African states exercise considerable agency in determining how they regulate and develop their own digital economies.
The piece challenges what it describes as the "Digital Silk Road narrative" - the idea that China's technology investments across Africa are systematically transferring Beijing's approach to data control, surveillance, and platform regulation to partner governments.
A more complex picture
According to the analysis, the reality on the ground is considerably more nuanced. African governments are not uniform in their policy choices, and many are drawing on a range of international models - including European data protection frameworks, regional African Union guidelines, and domestically developed approaches - rather than simply adopting Chinese templates.
The argument is that focusing too narrowly on Chinese influence risks obscuring the active role that African policymakers, civil society organisations, and regulators play in shaping their own digital governance landscapes.
This perspective does not dismiss the scale or significance of Chinese investment in African telecommunications infrastructure, which includes undersea cables, mobile networks, and data centres built by firms such as Huawei and ZTE. Rather, it contends that infrastructure provision does not automatically translate into governance influence.
Sovereignty as an active posture
The analysis frames African digital sovereignty not as something that must be defended against external actors, but as something that governments are actively constructing. Several African states have passed data protection laws, established national cybersecurity agencies, and engaged in regional standard-setting processes in recent years.
These developments, the piece argues, reflect deliberate policy choices rather than the passive absorption of norms from more powerful outside partners - whether those partners are Chinese, American, or European.
Broader implications
The framing has implications for how Western governments and institutions approach technology competition in Africa. Policies premised on the idea that African states need to be steered away from Chinese digital influence may underestimate local capacity and, in some cases, may be unwelcome to governments that view such framing as paternalistic.
The analysis, published in The Diplomat in April 2026, contributes to a wider scholarly conversation about the limits of great-power competition frameworks when applied to regions with their own distinct political dynamics and development priorities.
